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INTRODUCTION 
What role, if any, should a mental disorder diagnosis play in a criminal case where a 
defendant’s mental condition is in dispute? Richard Bonnie and Christopher Slobogin 
argue that courts should consider diagnoses in criminal proceedings: “Without the 
conceptual aid offered by diagnostic constructs, the factfinder will confront a bare 
description of symptoms, with only lay conceptions of illness to assist in 
interpretation.”1 In contrast, Stephen J. Morse argues that courts should not consider 
diagnoses and mental health expert witnesses should be limited to offering “full, rich, 
clinical descriptions of thoughts, feelings, and actions and relevant data.”2 According 
to Morse, “[d]iagnoses and unvalidated speculations are simply irrelevant” to the issue 
of culpability in a criminal trial.3 This Article attempts to reexamine this debate, at 
least with respect to the diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, in the context of the case 
of the Unabomber, Theodore Kaczynski. 
The Unabomber first struck on May 26, 1978, when a package addressed to an 
engineering professor exploded in a parking lot at the University of Illinois, Chicago, 
and injured a police officer.4 The Unabomber’s subsequent attacks included an 
                                                                                                                 
 
 * J.D., Stanford Law School, 2008. Many thanks to Professor Christopher Slobogin for 
all of his help and inspiration in developing this Article. 
 1. Richard J. Bonnie & Christopher Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in 
the Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 427, 468–69 (1980). 
 2. Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 777, 823 (1985). 
 3. Id. at 821–22. 
 4. Court TV Online, The Unabomber, http://www.courttv.com/trials/unabomber/ 
bombings.html. Unless otherwise indicated, the following factual account derives from this 
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explosive device in a cigar box, a defective bomb that caught on fire on an American 
Airlines flight, a package bomb addressed to the president of United Airlines, a pipe 
bomb left in the computer science department at the University of California, Berkeley, 
and a mail bomb at the University of Michigan. On December 11, 1985, a bomb 
containing nail fragments killed Hugh C. Scrutton, the owner of a computer rental 
store—the first of three Unabomber-related fatalities. The Unabomber attacked 
sporadically over the next ten years, resulting in severe injuries (for example, Yale 
computer scientist David Gelernter lost sight in one eye, hearing in one ear, and part of 
his right hand) and additional fatalities (including New York City advertising executive 
Thomas Mosser, whose firm worked for Exxon Corporation, and Gilbert Murray, the 
president of a timber lobbying group). 
On April 24, 1995, the New York Times received a letter in which the Unabomber 
promised to stop sending bombs if it published his 37,000-word magnum opus on the 
evil of modern technology. On September 19, 1995, the Washington Post printed the 
manifesto. David Kaczynski of Schenectady, New York, while helping his mother 
move, saw some of his brother Ted’s old journals and letters he had written to 
newspapers years earlier and noticed a similarity with the published manifesto.5 David 
contacted a lawyer and cooperated with the FBI.6 On April 3, 1996, in Lincoln, 
Montana, Theodore Kaczynski, a former University of California, Berkeley professor 
living in a one-room cabin without electricity, was arrested.7 
At trial, Kaczynski’s lawyers planned to argue that he suffered from paranoid 
schizophrenia and consequently could not form the intent to commit a premeditated 
crime.8 On December 8, 1997, Kaczynski wrote a letter to the judge, saying that he 
wanted to represent himself to avoid being labeled “mentally ill” by his lawyers.9 In 
response, his lawyers discarded the plan to make a mental illness defense during trial 
but convinced Kaczynski to allow them to use mental illness as a mitigating factor in 
the event of a sentencing phase.10 Despite this compromise, Kaczynski insisted on 
representing himself and, in order to do so, submitted to a psychological evaluation by 
Dr. Sally Johnson, who diagnosed Kaczynski with paranoid schizophrenia.11 After the 
judge denied Kaczynski’s petition for self-representation, Kaczynski continued to tell 
the judge and his lawyers that he did not want to be labeled mentally ill. At the same 
                                                                                                                 
source. 
 5. Nancy Gibbs, Tracking Down the Unabomber; The Harvard Hermit Discarded Modern 
Life 25 Years Ago; But After a Long and Obsessive Manhunt, the Feds Are Convinced They’ve 
Finally Got Their Mad Bomber, TIME, Apr. 15, 1996, at 38, 43. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Court TV Online, supra note 4. 
 8. David S. Jackson, At His Own Request: Is Kaczynski’s Rejection of His Best Chance for 
a Defense a Result of Paranoid Schizophrenia?, TIME, Jan. 12, 1998, at 40, 40. 
 9. Id. It should also be noted that it is a common trait of people with paranoid 
schizophrenia to resist being labeled as mentally ill. Id. While thought-provoking, this does not 
necessarily mean that he suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, as one might expect the same 
response from someone without the disorder. 
 10. Nancy Gibbs & David S. Jackson, In Fits and Starts: Kaczynski Throws the Unabom 
Trial into Disarray. Is He a Master Manipulator or Just Desperately Confused?, TIME, Jan. 12, 
1998, at 26, 26. One might assume that the specter of the death penalty might have softened 
Kaczynski’s convictions about not being labeled “mentally ill.” 
 11. Tamala M. Edwards, Crazy Is as Crazy Does: Why the Unabomber Agreed to a Guilty 
Plea for a Life Sentence, TIME, Feb. 2, 1998, at 66, 66. 
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time, prosecutors, fearing reversal, acquittal, or mistrial because of Kaczynski’s mental 
illness, offered Kaczynski a plea deal of life in prison. Kaczynski accepted the deal and 
currently resides at the federal “Supermax” prison in Florence, Colorado.12 
In this Article, using the Unabomber case as a springboard, I discuss some of the 
perils associated with permitting expert testimony related to a diagnosis of paranoid 
schizophrenia in criminal proceedings where the mental condition of the defendant is at 
issue. In Part I, I juxtapose the implications of a paranoid schizophrenia diagnosis with 
a highly plausible explanation for Theodore Kaczynski’s crimes and conclude that a 
paranoid schizophrenia diagnosis has strong potential to mislead a judge or jury in 
several important ways. In Part II, using Kaczynski as an example, I show how the 
misleading nature of a paranoid schizophrenia diagnosis can lead to criminal justice 
outcomes contrary to the purposes of the criminal law. In conclusion, I offer some 
tentative prescriptions. 
 
I. THE MISLEADING NATURE OF A PARANOID SCHIZOPHRENIA DIAGNOSIS 
A diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia suggests a lack of choice over one’s conduct. 
In contrast, Theodore Kaczynski, the Unabomber, plausibly chose to target people with 
mail bombs not because of brain dysfunction, but because of a series of deliberate 
decisions made in response to his own personal problems. Thus, a diagnosis of 
paranoid schizophrenia, if presented as evidence, can mislead a judge or jury in 
determining the mental condition of a criminal defendant. 
 
A. Paranoid Schizophrenia 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) sets forth the 
diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia.13 Two of the following “characteristic systems” 
must be present “for a significant portion of time during a 1-month period”: (1) 
“delusions,” (2) “hallucinations,” (3) “disorganized speech (e.g., frequent derailment or 
incoherence),” (4) “grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior,” or (5) “negative 
                                                                                                                 
 
 12. Stephen J. Dubner, “I Don’t Want To Live Long. I Would Rather Get the Death Penalty 
Than Spend the Rest of My Life in Prison”: Ted Kaczynski Talks About Life in Jail, His Appeal 
Plans and His Brother David, Who Still Struggles over the Decision to Turn in the Unabomber, 
TIME, Oct. 18, 1999, at 44, 44. 
 13. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASSOC., DSM-IV-TR: DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS 312 (Michael B. First ed., 4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. It is 
important to note, and consistent with the conclusions of this Article, that the DSM-IV contains 
a “Cautionary Statement” warning that “[t]he specified diagnostic criteria for each mental 
disorder are offered as guidelines for making diagnoses, because it has been demonstrated that 
the use of such criteria enhances agreement among clinicians and investigators.” Id. at xxxvii. 
However, “[t]hese diagnostic criteria and the DSM-IV Classification of mental disorders reflect a 
consensus of current formulations of evolving knowledge in our field. They do not encompass, 
however, all the conditions for which people may be treated or that may be appropriate topics 
for research efforts.” Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, “[t]he clinical and scientific 
considerations involved in categorization of these conditions as mental disorders may not be 
wholly relevant to legal judgments, for example, that take into account such issues as individual 
responsibility, disability, determination, and competency.” Id. 
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symptoms, i.e., affective flattening, alogia, or avolition.”14 These symptoms must 
persist for at least six months and cannot be caused by either a schizoaffective or mood 
disorder (major depressive, manic, or mixed) or substance abuse.15 
The DSM-IV defines paranoid schizophrenia as a subtype of the above. “The 
essential feature of the Paranoid Type of Schizophrenia is the presence of prominent 
delusions or auditory hallucinations in the context of a relative preservation of 
cognitive functioning and affect.”16 The delusions are often of a particular variety, 
“persecutory or grandiose,”17 but the DSM-IV notes that “delusions with other themes” 
may also occur.18 The delusions usually are “organized around a coherent theme” and 
often are accompanied by “anxiety, anger, aloofness, and argumentativeness.”19 People 
diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia may be predisposed to violence as a result of 
the combination of these symptoms.20 
According to the Mayo Clinic, people with paranoid schizophrenia “don’t perceive 
and respond to the world as most other people do.”21 They exhibit social withdrawal, 
unusual behavior, anxiety, and decline in daily functionality.22 They tend to suffer from 
delusions and auditory hallucinations.23 The Mayo Clinic describes delusions as 
“untrue beliefs,” including beliefs that “essentially no one else in the culture believes,” 
interpretations of experience “despite evidence or reasoning to the contrary,” and 
delusions of grandeur.24 These delusions can result in violence if the person with 
paranoid schizophrenia perceives a threat warranting self-defense.25 The Mayo Clinic 
describes auditory hallucinations as the perception of sounds and voices that no one 
else hears.26 The voices “are usually unpleasant” and may give a “constant critique of 
what the person is thinking or doing.”27 In addition to delusions and auditory 
hallucinations, a person with paranoid schizophrenia may experience the following 
symptoms: disorganized thinking, disorganized or irrational behavior, physical 
immobility, mobility without purpose, absent or inappropriate emotional expression, 
little verbal communication, and the inability to initiate plans.28 
The Mayo Clinic ascribes the incidence of paranoid schizophrenia primarily to 
organic, structural causes.29 The staff asserts that most researchers believe 
                                                                                                                 
 
 14. Id. at 312. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 313. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 314. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Mayo Clinic Staff, Paranoid Schizophrenia Definition (Dec. 12, 2006), 
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/paranoid-schizophrenia/DS00862#. 
 22. Mayo Clinic Staff, Paranoid Schizophrenia Symptoms (Dec. 12, 2006), 
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/paranoid-schizophrenia/DS00862/DSECTION=symptoms. 
 23. See id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See id. 
 29. See Mayo Clinic Staff, Paranoid Schizophrenia Causes (Dec. 12, 2006), 
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/paranoid-schizophrenia/DS00862/DSECTION=causes. 
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schizophrenia results from “problems with early brain development.”30 They point to 
studies which “have focused on the way brain cells communicate with each other 
through nerve pathways. Too many or too few connections in important pathways of 
emotional regulation may lead to psychotic symptoms.”31 Thus, the Mayo Clinic paints 
a picture of paranoid schizophrenia as a debilitating, disorienting mental disease that 
can result in detachment from the real world and behavior driven by delusions and 
hallucinations beyond the patient’s control. 
 
B. The Diagnosis of the Unabomber 
Dr. Sally Johnson diagnosed Kaczynski with paranoid schizophrenia.32 Dr. Johnson 
relied largely on two delusional beliefs harbored by Kaczynski. The first was 
delusional thinking “involving being controlled by modern technology.”33 The second 
was that his “dysfunction in life, particularly his inability to establish a relationship 
with a female, was directly the result of extreme psychological verbal abuse by his 
parents.”34 In addition, Kaczynski’s “social and occupational dysfunction in the areas 
of work, interpersonal relations, and possibly at times self-care” contributed to the 
diagnosis.35 The “paranoid” subtype derived largely from the “persecutory” nature of 
his delusions.36 Consequently, he became “resentful and angry” toward the objects of 
his delusions (such as modern technology) and fantasized about and actually resorted 
to violence (the multi-decade crime spree of the Unabomber).37 Dr. Johnson also noted 
that Kaczynski developed “idealized romantic attachments to women with whom he 
has little familiarity or contact.”38 She believed that this tendency was consistent with 
schizophrenia, as she called such attachments “erotomanic delusions.”39 
                                                                                                                 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. SALLY C. JOHNSON, PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION OF THEODORE KACZYNSKI (Jan. 16, 
1998), http://courttv.com/trials/unabomber/documents/ psychological.html [hereinafter JOHNSON 
EVALUATION]. Dr. Johnson also diagnosed Kaczynski with premorbid Paranoid Personality 
Disorder with Avoidant and Antisocial Features, on the basis that Kaczynski suspected, 
“without sufficient basis,” that others were exploiting, harming, or deceiving him. Id. Four other 
doctors diagnosed Kaczynski with paranoid schizophrenia, although without the detailed 
analysis of Dr. Johnson, including Dr. Raquel Gur, M.D., Ph.D.; Dr. Karen Froming; Dr. David 
Foster; and Xavier Amador, Ph.D. See id. However, the prosecution’s doctors, Phillip Resnick 
and Park Dietz, disagreed. They believed that Kaczynski’s problems merely fell in the Schizoid 
or Schizotypal range of personality disorders. See id. John T. Kenny, Ph.D., also disagreed with 
the paranoid schizophrenia diagnosis. See id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 45. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See id. According to the Unabomber’s Manifesto: “The Industrial Revolution and its 
consequences have been a disaster for the human race.” THE UNABOMBER’S MANIFESTO, 
http://www.time.com/time/reports/unabomber/wholemanifesto.html. In the Unabomber's mind, 
society was in desperate need of a brave and brazen savior who would not let murder stand in 
his way. See id. 
 38. JOHNSON EVALUATION, supra note 32. 
 39. Id. 
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C. A Plausible Explanation: Cognitive Dissonance and Deliberate Choice 
Although a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia might suggest a lack of self-control, 
Kaczynski’s transformation into the Unabomber was plausibly the product of careful 
planning and deliberation, not organic compulsion. Admittedly, there is no way to 
ascertain the truth of the matter; it could simply be coincidence that a choice-driven 
explanation fits with the facts of his life. However, the possibility alone highlights the 
potential, in any given instance, for a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia to 
misrepresent a person’s mental condition. 
 
1. Social Respect, Cognitive Dissonance, and Scapegoating 
The literature on psychology indicates that people can exhibit violent aggression 
toward perceived external threats as a result of normal psychological mechanisms—the 
need for social respect, cognitive dissonance, and scapegoating. We all have an innate 
need for social respect and, consequently, hate to be ignored or dismissed as 
unimportant.40 When we perceive a lack of respect or regard, we might experience 
cognitive dissonance, or an inconsistency between our expectations and reality.41 When 
we experience cognitive dissonance, our tendency is to change our beliefs so as to 
regain internal consistency,42 possibly by engaging in scapegoating—“a significant 
mechanism which underlies social aggression.” 43 “Scapegoating seems to be a 
mechanism that can bring out the very worst in human nature. As things get difficult, 
people become frustrated and angry and they take that anger out on the nearest clearly 
identifiable target.”44 Accordingly, as described in the account below, Kaczynski’s 
transformation into the Unabomber may have resulted from conscious choices to 
relieve his own cognitive dissonance, not from organic compulsion.45 
                                                                                                                 
 
 40. NICKY HAYES, TEACH YOURSELF PSYCHOLOGY 94 (3d ed. 2003). 
 41. “Cognitive dissonance is a psychological phenomenon first identified by Leon 
Festinger. It occurs when there is a discrepancy between what a person believes, knows and 
values, and persuasive information that calls these into question.” ProEthics, Ltd., Definitions 
and Concepts for Ethical Analysis, http://www.ethicsscoreboard.com/rb_definitions.html. 
 42. HAYES, supra note 40, at 96. 
 43. Id. at 97. 
 44. Id. 
 45. An important disclaimer in this discussion is that paranoid schizophrenia may not be 
caused simply by genetic or organic factors: varying proportions of genetic predisposition and 
life experiences may contribute to the ultimate onset of paranoid schizophrenia. See generally 
Jason Schiffman, Amy Abrahamson, Tyrone Cannon, Joseph LaBrie, Joseph Parnas, Fini 
Schulsinger & Sarnoff Mednick, Early Rearing Factors in Schizophrenia, 30 INT’L J. MENTAL 
HEALTH 3 (2001). Thus, even assuming that the scenario as described in this section is correct, 
that Kaczynski chose to become the Unabomber and carry out murder and mayhem as a result of 
life experiences, it is possible that he simultaneously possessed a genetic predisposition to 
become schizophrenic and that the combination of his genetic predisposition and his life choices 
resulted in the ultimate onset of the illness. Still, the point of this Part is to show that, even if 
Kaczynski did ultimately develop paranoid schizophrenia, the very paranoid schizophrenia that 
he possessed may have been misrepresentative of his actual mental condition. That is, the 
implications of the Mayo Clinic and, to a lesser extent, the DSM-IV may be incorrect: a person 
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Kaczynski’s problems began early in life. Because of his precociousness, his parents 
focused on developing his intellectual and academic abilities at the expense of a 
“normal childhood.”46 As Kaczynski grew older—either because of his early childhood 
experiences or simply because of his innate personality characteristics—he developed a 
highly introverted personality: he played beside other children and not with them; he 
was often fearful of other people; and he was generally socially reserved. By age eight 
or nine, it was apparent that Kaczynski was not socially accepted by other children his 
age. Moreover, his family relocated several times, only compounding the problem. 
Kaczynski took tests that showed him to have an extremely high IQ, reportedly 170.47 
He proceeded to skip two grades. He was not involved in many school activities. In 
fact, in Kaczynski’s own writings, he wrote that he skipped two grades because of his 
lack of social skills. “By the time I left high school, I was definitely regarded as a freak 
by a large segment of the student body.”48 
Kaczynski’s social isolation and frustration increased when he enrolled at Harvard 
College at age sixteen (he graduated at age twenty).49 In his own writings, Kaczynski 
described his extreme isolation as a Harvard student. He often became very angry and, 
because he could not express his anger openly, “indulge[d] in fantasies of revenge.”50 
However, he “never attempted to put any such fantasies into effect because [he] was 
too strongly conditioned . . . against any defiance of authority.”51 Kaczynski later said 
that he “could not have committed a crime of revenge, even a relatively minor crime, 
because [his] fear of being caught and punished was all out of proportion to the actual 
danger of being caught.”52 
Kaczynski, by his own account, suffered from “acute sexual starvation.”53 He noted 
that 
[M]y attempts to make advances to girls had such humiliating results that for many 
years afterward, even until after the age of 30, I found it excruciatingly difficult—
almost impossible—to make advances on women . . . .At the age of 19 to 20, I had 
a girlfriend; the only one I ever had, I regret to say.54 
This frustration reached such extreme levels that, while a graduate student at the 
University of Michigan, Kaczynski experienced “several weeks of intense and 
                                                                                                                 
with paranoid schizophrenia—such as Kaczynski—may indeed have control over his actions 
and be able to exercise choice. Thus, although Kaczynski may have technically fulfilled the 
DSM-IV criteria, for example, he may not have carried with him the implication that illness 
causes behavior. On the contrary, it is possible that, at least in some cases, behavior may cause 
(or amount to) illness; that is, the choices that a person makes might satisfy diagnostic criteria 
without having any abnormal, organic, or compulsive force behind them. 
 46. See JOHNSON EVALUATION, supra note 32. 
 47. See Karl Stampfl, He Came Ted Kaczynski, He Left the Unabomber, MICH. DAILY, Mar. 
16, 2006, available at http://www.michigandaily.com/content/he-came-ted-kaczynski-he-left-
unabomber. 
 48. JOHNSON EVALUATION, supra note 32. 
 49. See Stampfl, supra note 47. 
 50. JOHNSON EVALUATION, supra note 32. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id.  
 53. Dubner, supra note 12, at 47. 
 54. Id. 
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persistent sexual excitement involving fantasies of being a female. During that time 
period, he became convinced that he should undergo a sex-change surgery.”55 This 
obsession, however, passed.56 
Also at the University of Michigan, he began to search for ways to blame his intense 
sadness and frustration on something other than himself. Thus, Kaczynski wrote that 
I occasionally began having dreams . . . [in which] I would feel either that 
organized society was hounding me with accusation in some way, or that 
organized society was trying in some way to capture my mind and tie me down 
psychologically or both . . . . But I would grow angrier and finally I would break 
out in physical violence against the psychologist and his allies . . . I would awake 
with a pleasurable sense of liberation.57 
Kaczynski was ripe for a scapegoat and consequently found one. Since he already felt 
alienated from modern society, the ideas of author Jacques Ellul were particularly 
attractive to him. He read Ellul’s book The Technological Society58 six times and was 
captivated by Ellul’s ideas, which he adopted into his own views: that continued 
scientific and technical progress within society would inevitably result in the extinction 
of individual liberty and that the power of society to control the individual was growing 
rapidly (through such means as propaganda, control over children’s emotional 
development, operant conditioning, and direct control of emotions by way of 
electrodes and “chemitrodes,” biofeedback training, memory pills, genetic engineering, 
super-human computers, and electronic surveillance).59 
Armed with antipathy toward modernity, Kaczynski finally decided to isolate 
himself from the source of his pain when he quit his job as an assistant mathematics 
professor at the University of California, Berkeley and built a small cabin in the 
Montana woods in 1971. He subsequently wrote in his journal: 
True I would not fit into the present society in any case but that is not an 
intolerable situation. What makes a situation intolerable is the fact that in all 
probability, the values that I detest will soon be achieved through science, an 
utterly complete and permanent victory throughout the whole world, with a total 
extrication of everything I value.60 
As the culmination of a lifetime of isolation and frustration, Kaczynski—no longer 
impeded by the social mores of people around him—wrote that he was going to start to 
kill.61 He would later describe the source of his hatred as perceived social rejection and 
the fact that organized society frustrated his “powerful urge for physical freedom and 
personal autonomy.”62 
                                                                                                                 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. See id. 
 57. JOHNSON EVALUATION, supra note 32. 
 58. JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (1967). 
 59. See JOHNSON EVALUATION, supra note 32. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. 
 62. Id. 
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Dr. Johnson and other mental health professionals attributed Kaczynski’s obsessions 
and violent behavior to paranoid schizophrenia, as though the illness was at fault, not 
Kaczynski’s own decisions and choice.63 This may have been incorrect. Kaczynski was 
a sad, unhappy man who was never able to fit in with society. It is not a surprise that, 
given his innate need for social respect and the dearth of such respect in his life, he 
experienced cognitive dissonance; the painful reality of his life did not match his innate 
social needs. He attempted to resolve this cognitive dissonance by finding a scapegoat 
in modern technology. And bereft of social influences to keep his angry fantasies in 
check once he isolated himself in Montana, he was free to relieve the painful cognitive 
dissonance he had suffered his whole life by finally lashing out in a violent way at his 
scapegoat. While this scenario is by no means a certainty, it is at minimum consistent 
with both his life story and the psychological literature. 
 
2. Lay Opinions 
The non-medical opinions of Kaczynski and his acquaintances support the above 
scenario. The views of Kaczynski’s acquaintances in Lincoln, Montana suggest that, at 
least overtly, Kaczynski was not insane or out of control. Becky Garland, Kaczynski’s 
friend, said, “‘I can’t imagine anybody saying he’s insane. You might say that anyone 
who makes mail bombs is insane . . . . But insane by law? I don’t think he was that.’”64 
Teresa Garland, Becky’s sister, said, 
“Ted didn’t have much of a childhood . . . he was very unhappy because he always 
had to study, and he didn’t spend much time around other people . . . . They 
wanted to know if we felt he was normal when he came into town . . . . And I think 
it’s fair to say that, yes, he was.”65 
Dave Rundell, another acquaintance, said, “‘I always thought he acted, for a person 
who was a recluse, well within the bounds of society. He always seemed a little jumpy. 
But I put that down to the fact that he was not a social person.’”66 His neighbors 
described Kaczynski in a benign way: he was gentle, soft-spoken, and painfully shy. 
Kaczynski himself, in an interview after he was imprisoned, asserted categorically 
that he was not insane. 
“I’m confident that I’m sane, personally . . . . I don’t get delusions and so on and 
so forth . . . . I mean, I had very serious problems with social adjustment in 
adolescence, and a lot of people would call this a sickness. But it would have to be 
distinguished between an organic illness, like schizophrenia or something like 
that.”67 
                                                                                                                 
 
 63. It is not disputed here that Kaczynski may have technically qualified for paranoid 
schizophrenia under the official criteria. Even assuming that he suffered from paranoid 
schizophrenia, the point here is that this designation, by itself, has a tenuous relationship to 
reality. 
 64. David S. Jackson, He’s Not Crazy, He’s Our Neighbor; In Montana, Ted Kaczynski’s 
Acquaintances Insist He Was Normal, TIME, Nov. 3, 1997, at 4, 4. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Dubner, supra note 12, at 44. 
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Although Kaczynski did not directly explain his multi-decade bombing spree, he did 
provide reason to think that his resort to violence was the product of measured 
consideration: “Well, let me put it this way . . . . I don’t know if violence is ever the 
best solution, but there are certain circumstances in which it may be the only 
solution.”68 
While these opinions are not definitive,69 they do lend further support to the theory 
that Kaczynski was not out of control but rather chose to carry out violent and 
premeditated bombing attacks for other reasons. Dr. Johnson might call his views 
toward technology “delusional,”70 but one could also view them as the product of 
scapegoating. The implications of this distinction are significant: while paranoid 
schizophrenia suggests the presence of a variety of symptoms and a lack of self-
control, Kaczynski may have simply made a choice to become the Unabomber as a 
response to his personal dissatisfaction with the world.71 
 
D. Three Problems with a Paranoid Schizophrenia Diagnosis in Criminal 
Proceedings 
A judge or a jury tasked with making determinations about a criminal defendant’s 
mental condition may consider evidence by a mental health expert.72 The above 
discussion, however, suggests that a mental health expert’s testimony about a diagnosis 
of paranoid schizophrenia can mislead a judge or jury in at least three ways: (1) by 
wrongly suggesting that a defendant exhibits certain symptoms; (2) by distorting the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 68. Id. at 52. 
 69. In fact, a characteristic trait of schizophrenia is to deny that one possesses it. Peter 
Weiden & Leston Havens, How to Manage Five Common Symptoms of Schizophrenia, 
SCHIZOPHRENIA.COM, http://www.schizophrenia.com/family/mansymptoms.htm. Thus, it is 
possible that people might feel that they have total control over their faculties and yet still be 
influenced by their mental illness. This possibility, however, does not eliminate the possibility 
that in other cases a person feels that he or she is in control and actually is in control. The matter 
of which is correct in a particular case is a difficult one and only highlights the need to approach 
each case in a factually specific way and not simply to apply the same catch-all diagnosis to 
every set of shared symptoms. 
 70. JOHNSON EVALUATION, supra note 32. 
 71. At the same time, it does not necessarily mean that Kaczynski’s diagnosis was 
“incorrect”; rather, it simply emphasizes the limitations of a paranoid schizophrenia diagnosis. 
Under Dr. Johnson’s definitions of “delusions” and “dysfunction,” Ted Kaczynski may have 
technically qualified for a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. See id. However, a diagnosis 
implies lack of a choice, while Ted Kaczynski’s condition may have been the product of choice, 
of a highly intelligent man making life decisions in response to the circumstances he faced. 
While psychological diagnoses may be useful in other settings, the result, as described in the 
next Part, is that—at least in cases like that of Kaczynski—they can pose difficulties in the 
course of criminal proceedings. 
 72. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 702; Pollard v. United States, 282 F.2d 450, 464 (6th Cir. 
1960); Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 1, at 468–70; Emily Bazelon, Crazy Law: The Supreme 
Court Beats Up on the Insanity Defense, SLATE, July 6, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2145139 
(describing the views of former D.C. Circuit Judge David L. Bazelon). 
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traits that a defendant actually does exhibit; and (3) by suggesting that organic factors, 
not individual choice, are responsible for a defendant’s conduct.73 
 
1. The Suggestion of Symptoms Not Actually Present 
The DSM-IV and the Mayo Clinic both identify a wide range of symptoms 
associated with paranoid schizophrenia,74 including delusions, auditory hallucinations 
(including voices and sounds that no one else hears), disorganized speech (“e.g., 
frequent derailment or incoherence”), disorganized or catatonic behavior, “negative 
symptoms, i.e., affective flattening, alogia, or avolition,”75 anxiety, anger, aloofness, 
argumentativeness, disorganized thinking, disorganized or irrational behavior, physical 
immobility, mobility without purpose, absent or inappropriate emotional expression, 
little verbal communication, and the inability to initiate plans.76 
A person with paranoid schizophrenia, however, may not exhibit all of these 
symptoms.77 Dr. Johnson attributed Kaczynski’s diagnosis primarily to the occurrence 
of delusions (being “controlled by modern technology”78) and his “social and 
occupation dysfunction in the areas of work, interpersonal relations, and possibly at 
times self-care.”79 Absent are the following: auditory hallucinations, disorganized 
thinking or speech, disorganized or irrational behavior, physical immobility, mobility 
without a purpose, or the inability to initiate plans.80 
Although the literature does not require all possible symptoms to be present in a 
diagnosed individual, extraneous, non-applicable characteristics could still be 
misleading to a judge or jury. First, regardless of the actual symptoms of the defendant, 
a judge or jury may be exposed to literature on the full range of possible diagnostic 
                                                                                                                 
 
 73. While this Article points out problems with mental disorder diagnoses, and a paranoid 
schizophrenia diagnosis in particular, I recognize that diagnoses may be useful in other settings. 
See, e.g., Steven R. Smith, A Psychological Perspective on Diagnosis, 81 J. PERSONALITY 
ASSESSMENT 187, 187 (2003) (book review) (“[C]ategorizing phenomena of nature is a survival 
strategy. We are compelled to group elements of our experience as to easily recognize what 
might be harmful or helpful to us. Categorization helps us remember, process, and assimilate 
new information.”). However, even in the scientific community, “[o]ne charge frequently levied 
against the DSM is that it creates artificial categories of disorder based on arbitrary distinctions.” 
Id. 
 74. Admittedly, at least in the case of the DSM-IV, certain symptoms, such as auditory 
hallucinations, are not required if others, such as delusions, are present. See DSM-IV, supra note 
13. Once a person has a particular diagnosis attached to him or her, that clinical description 
itself is also attached. Thus, when Kaczynski was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, the 
description one had to refer to in order to understand his condition was in fact a description that 
listed auditory hallucinations. The fact that these non-applicable symptoms are not relevant is 
why I advocate caution in using such diagnoses in criminal proceedings. 
 75. Id. at 312. 
 76. Mayo Clinic Staff, supra note 22. 
 77. As explained in Part I.A, the DSM-IV only requires two of five characteristics to 
establish a diagnosis of schizophrenia; more specific symptoms are required for the paranoid 
sub-type. See DSM-IV, supra note 13. 
 78. JOHNSON EVALUATION, supra note 32. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See id. 
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symptoms. While some judges or jurors may be able to block out irrelevant 
information, others may form stereotypes, wonder if other symptoms are simply latent 
or unidentified, or at least view the defendant in a slightly different light. Second, the 
introduction of all possible symptoms can create a burden-shifting problem. If a 
defendant is diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and paranoid schizophrenia is 
known to encapsulate certain characteristics, then it becomes the prosecutor’s burden 
(assuming that it is in the defendant’s interest to portray himself as mentally disabled as 
possible) to show that those characteristics or traits are not present. This means that the 
prosecutor will have to show evidence that the defendant does not have a certain trait 
or characteristic (probably from the psychological evaluation).81 However, since it is 
difficult to prove a negative, there may be lingering thoughts in the judge or jury as to 
the presence of extraneous traits, which could influence their ultimate determinations. 
While the prosecutor may succeed in convincing the judge or jury of the absence of 
certain traits, it is by no means a certainty. 
 
2. The Distortion of Actual Symptoms 
A dictionary is generally thought to be a repository of the ordinary understanding of 
words.82 The dictionary defines “delusion” as “a false conception and persistent belief 
unconquerable by reason in something that has no existence in fact.”83 This definition 
conjures the image of a complete lack of choice or control over one’s thoughts. If it 
allowed for choice or control, then the delusional individual could presumably identify 
the disparity between his or her thoughts and the incontrovertible disproval and adjust 
his or her thoughts accordingly. Therefore, when most people hear the word 
“delusion,” this sort of definition is what comes to mind. 
The DSM-IV does not employ this definition. Instead, the DSM-IV uses multiple 
descriptive terms that allow for several different and less restrictive conceptions of a 
delusion.84 One descriptive phrase is “a false belief based on incorrect inference about 
external reality.”85 There is, however, no uniform way to interpret external reality; 
different people invariably will come to different conclusions about the world. A 
second phrase in the DSM-IV definition is “firmly sustained despite what everyone else 
                                                                                                                 
 
 81. See e.g., United States v. Madoch, 935 F. Supp. 965, 968 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (containing 
an example of an expert who, after labeling the defendant with a particular diagnosis, proceeds 
to list the characteristics associated with the diagnosis, thus introducing a possible conception of 
the defendant that derives from diagnostic literature rather than from the defendant himself). 
 82. See, e.g., Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls v. Mega Systems, 350 F.3d 1327, 1338 
(Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 83. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 598 (1993). 
 84. The full definition employed by the DSM-IV is as follows: 
[A] false belief based on an incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly 
sustained despite what almost everyone else believes and despite what constitutes 
incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary. The belief is not 
one ordinarily accepted by other members of the person’s culture or sub-culture. 
Jaimie Leeser & William O’Donohue, What Is Delusion? Epistemological Dimensions, 108 J. 
ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 687, 687 (1999) (reprinting the DSM-IV definition). 
 85. Id. 
2009] THE UNABOMBER REVISITED 13 
 
believes.”86 This phrase suggests that the belief does not have to be absolute, only 
“firmly sustained.” It also suggests that the prevailing societal view on a matter is a 
relevant criterion in deciding whether a person is delusional. Galileo, however, was 
widely condemned for proclaiming that the earth traveled around the sun. The DSM-IV 
adds additional emphasis to this point by adding that the “belief is not one ordinarily 
accepted by other members of the person’s culture or sub-culture.”87 Yet, it is possible 
to have a belief, and to have some choice over the matter, in the face of extreme 
divergence from the prevailing views of society; original thinkers or quirky eccentrics 
are all potential schizophrenics under the DSM-IV. 
The DSM-IV does contain the qualification that the belief must be sustained 
“despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the 
contrary,”88 but this language does not rectify the misleading nature of a diagnosis 
under the DSM-IV. First, the fact that this is not the only factor suggests that it is not 
the only relevant factor: the value judgments of the diagnostician and the beliefs of 
society are also relevant. Second, the difficulty of producing evidence that is literally 
“incontrovertible” suggests that “obvious proof” will usually be the basis for a delusion 
determination. “Obvious proof,” however, raises a question: obvious to whom? The 
only answer possibly supplied by the definition is the mental health diagnostician or, 
more likely, society at large. Thus, this circular definition leads the diagnostician back 
to a consideration of either his or her own value judgments or else the prevailing views 
of society. 
More significantly, as evidenced in Dr. Johnson’s report, a diagnostician may not 
make a concerted effort to obtain incontrovertible falsification. Dr. Johnson simply 
noted that Kaczynski believed that he was “controlled by modern technology” and that 
he suffered verbal and physical abuse from his parents and, apparently, assumed that 
these observations might be good enough to qualify as diagnosable delusions.89 The 
reality is that truly proving that something is “incontrovertible” is either impossible or 
else far too time-consuming for a standard mental disorder diagnosis. Therefore, even 
the watered-down standards of the DSM-IV90 are probably significantly more 
demanding than those actually used by diagnosticians. 
Thus, while Kaczynski was technically diagnosed with delusions, the type that he 
harbored may not have been of the strict dictionary variety. As discussed, Kaczynski 
may have formed his obsession and anger toward modern technology by choice, not 
compulsion. The belief in a scapegoat is not a dictionary-type of delusion in the sense 
that a person cannot consider alternatives. Moreover, although a diagnostician could 
rightly look to the DSM-IV and argue that Kaczynski’s belief system was delusional 
because it was out of sync with prevailing views about society, it could qualify equally 
as a “theory.” A “theory” is “a belief, policy, or procedure proposed or followed as the 
basis of action.”91 Kaczynski clearly had a belief in the evil of modern technology and 
relied on it in justifying his violence as the Unabomber, but evidence that Kaczynski 
was devoid of any choice or self-control in harboring that belief is lacking. Thus, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. JOHNSON EVALUATION, supra note 32. 
 90. See generally Leeser & O’Donohue, supra note 84. 
 91. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2371 (1993). 
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although Dr. Johnson may have believed that Kaczynski was delusional, she simply 
may have disagreed with his theory about the world, a theory to which he passionately 
adhered. 
A judge or jury, then, upon hearing that a defendant has paranoid schizophrenia, 
and that one of the defendant’s defining characteristics is “delusions,” may 
understandably think that the defendant harbors a truly psychotic belief over which he 
has no control. As seen above, the reality of how delusions are used in diagnosing 
patients with paranoid schizophrenia can be very different: a diagnosed delusion can 
simply be a theory possessed by the defendant with which the diagnostician, or most of 
society, does not agree. Thus, a judge or jury could end up making an incorrect 
determination as to the control and level of psychosis involved in a defendant’s 
thinking simply because of the application of a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. 
 
3. The Suggestion of Organic Causation 
A diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia may lead a judge or jury to believe that the 
illness itself, and not individual choice, is responsible for symptomatic behavior. The 
Mayo Clinic attributes paranoid schizophrenia to “problems with early brain 
development” and “the way brain cells communicate with each other through nerve 
pathways.”92 Since a person has no volitional control over early brain development or 
the way brain cells communicate, this attribution suggests that brain dysfunction, not 
the defendant’s own choice, is responsible for symptoms of the illness. Furthermore, 
the mere application of a diagnosis to a person’s problems suggests determinism. For 
example, a diagnosis of bronchitis means that the illness, and not some other factor, is 
responsible for any congestion, coughing, or respiratory problems that a patient 
experiences. Given this common understanding of a diagnosis, it is possible that a 
judge or jury might apply the same causal connection to mental disorders. 
As the Unabomber case shows, this causal connection may not always be accurate. 
Kaczynski possibly developed his symptoms by choice. In the plausible scenario 
described above, Kaczynski suffered cognitive dissonance and sadness from his social 
ostracism. Despite his desire for interpersonal relationships, Kaczynski was not able to 
achieve any. It is possible that Kaczynski then chose to withdraw from society in 
response to these problems. It is also possible that, alone, Kaczynski chose to read 
Ellul, latch onto notions about the evils of modern technology, and make modernity a 
scapegoat for his problems. Normal people, without mental disorders, do this on a 
daily basis when they refuse to acknowledge responsibility for the dissatisfaction in 
their lives.93 Thus, the introduction of a paranoid schizophrenia diagnosis into evidence 
could lead a judge or jury to conclude incorrectly that a criminal defendant had no 
control over his symptoms.94 
                                                                                                                 
 
 92. Mayo Clinic Staff, supra note 29. 
 93. See HAYES, supra note 40, at 96–97. It is possible that these same symptoms could 
result in a different diagnosis, such as schizoid personality disorder or schizotypal personality 
disorder. See JOHNSON EVALUATION, supra note 32. However, these diagnoses would still pose 
the problem of over-inclusive diagnostic criteria. 
 94. Aside from organic causation, another form of causation discussed in criminological 
literature is ecological causation, or the impact that external or situational factors have on a 
person’s decision making. See, e.g., Robert E. Park, The City: Suggestions for Investigation of 
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II. HOW A DIAGNOSIS OF PARANOID SCHIZOPHRENIA CAN LEAD TO OUTCOMES 
INCONSISTENT WITH THE GOALS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
In this Part, I use the Unabomber case to show how a diagnosis of paranoid 
schizophrenia can lead to legal outcomes diametrically opposed to the goals of the 
criminal law. A consideration of paranoid schizophrenia evidence could have led a 
judge or jury to find Theodore Kaczynski not guilty by reason of insanity or else 
ineligible for the death penalty; both of these conclusions, as I explain, would possibly 
have been inconsistent with the goals of the criminal law. 
 
A. The Insanity Defense 
1. The Rationale  
Although a variety of conceptions of the insanity defense exist,95 the two dominant 
forms in American jurisprudence are the M’Naghten test and the American Law 
Institute’s Model Penal Code test. The M’Naghten test, as generally applied, is that a 
criminal defendant is legally insane if he “did not know the nature and quality of [his] 
act or that the act was wrong.”96 The Model Penal Code test, which has fallen out of 
favor in recent years, is that 
[a] person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as 
a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law.97 
The rationale for the insanity defense, in its varied formulations, derives from the 
Punishment Model of criminal justice.98 The goal of the Punishment Model is to ensure 
that those who commit antisocial acts receive their “just deserts.”99 There have been 
many attempts to explain the Punishment Model’s emphasis on sanctioning past 
behavior. Kant believed that “punishment is a categorical imperative.”100 Hegel 
                                                                                                                 
Human Behavior in the Urban Environment, in THE CITY 1 (1925); CLIFFORD R. SHAW & HENRY 
D. MCKAY, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND URBAN AREAS: A STUDY OF RATES OF DELINQUENTS  IN 
RELATION TO DIFFERENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN AMERICAN CITIES 
(1942). However, ecological causation is not suggested by the diagnostic literature on paranoid 
schizophrenia, at least according to the DSM-IV and the Mayo Clinic; therefore, ecological 
theories are not directly relevant to the discussion. 
 95. See generally CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE 
WITH MENTAL DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 29–51 (2006) (explaining the historical 
development of the insanity defense). 
 96. Id. at 29. 
 97. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962). 
 98. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 95, at 24 (Since “the retributive principle that 
blameworthiness should be the predominating guidepost of the criminal law’s attempt to define 
the scope of liability . . . the punishment model should be the governing concept in this 
context.”). 
 99. Id. at 9. 
 100. Id. (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 120 (John 
Ladd trans., 1965) (1797)). 
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believed that punishment is necessary to “cancel the Wrong and restore the Right.”101 
Foucault believed that punishment eradicates the evil represented by a crime.102 Paul 
Robinson believes that “people are more likely to abide by the commands of the 
criminal law if they believe it has ‘moral credibility,’ which it will lack if it imposes 
blame where there is none.”103 The common theme in all these attempts to rationalize 
the Punishment Model is the “free will” postulate, explained as follows: “[i]f behavior 
is determined by forces over which the person has little or no control, then punishment 
would not be just, because it would not be deserved.”104 Thus, for an actor to be held 
accountable for an act, proof is required that the actor “voluntarily” chose to engage in 
illegal conduct.105 
The key issue related to the proper applicability of the insanity defense, therefore, 
should be whether the defendant manifested “free will” at the time of the offense. 
Unfortunately, the concept of free will is one of the most problematic in the field of 
philosophy of the mind. It is not clear that free will even exists.106 Even if free will 
does exist, many “determinisms” could negate it in particular circumstances, including 
physical/causal, psychological, biological, and theological determinisms.107 Finally, 
even if free will exists, different formulations abound as to what exactly it means,108 
such as the “ability to select a course of action as a means of fulfilling some desire.”109 
 
2. The Insanity Defense and Paranoid Schizophrenia 
A diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia could possibly lead a judge or jury to find a 
defendant not guilty by reason of insanity. Under the M’Naghten test, a person who 
suffers from delusions or auditory hallucinations may not be able to differentiate 
between criminal and non-criminal conduct, such as a person who believes incurably 
that God is commanding her to kill her children.110 Also, a person suffering from 
disorganized thinking may not be able to grasp the nature or quality of her conduct. 
Under the Model Penal Code test, furthermore, a person suffering from delusions or 
                                                                                                                 
 
 101. Id. (citing GEORG W. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 69 (T.M. Knox trans., 1962) 
(1820)). 
 102. Id. (citing MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISHMENT: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 
3–16 (1977)). 
 103. Id. (quoting Paul Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76 
B.U. L. REV. 201, 211 (1996)) (based on the premise that society deems punishment as 
legitimate). 
 104. Id. at 9. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See Timothy O’Connor, Free Will, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(Edward N. Zalta ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See generally id. Among these different formulations are free will as rational 
deliberation (including free will as choosing on the basis of one’s desires, free will as 
deliberative choosing on the basis of desires and values, and self-mastery or rightly-ordered 
appetite), free will as ownership, free will as causation and control, and theological conceptions 
of free will. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See, e.g., Katherine Ramsland, Andrea Yates, The Texas Woman Who Drowned Her 
Five Children, http://www.trutv.com/library/crime/notorious_murders/women/andrea_yates/. 
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disorganized behavior caused by organic structural problems in the brain may not have 
any volitional control over her behavior. These outcomes comport with the rationale 
for the insanity defense, based on the free will postulate. A person with paranoid 
schizophrenia may not, as a result of delusional or hallucinatory thinking, have any 
choice over her conduct and may not be able to perceive multiple options and evaluate 
them. If the person with paranoid schizophrenia had this ability, then she would 
presumably be able to evaluate multiple courses of action with respect to her delusion, 
which is contrary to the theory behind an actual, unchanging delusion. Thus, to the 
extent that a judge or jury is influenced by literature on a paranoid schizophrenia 
diagnosis, a judge or jury could find a defendant otherwise responsible for a crime not 
guilty by reason of insanity. 
 
3. The Insanity Defense and the Unabomber 
In contrast, at least under the plausible scenario outlined in Part I, Theodore 
Kaczynski should not have been found legally insane. First, unlike the classical 
conception of paranoid schizophrenia, Kaczynski’s life experiences, and the choices he 
made in response to them, resulted from his anger toward modernity, not organic 
causes beyond his control. Second, as Kaczynski himself asserted, his anger toward 
modern technology was not a delusion over which he had no control; rather, it was a 
theory to which he subscribed after years of contemplation. 111 Third, the fact that 
Kaczynski only started killing after he removed himself to a life of solitude in Montana 
suggests that moral and social influences constrained him prior to the move; if 
Kaczynski had no choice, if his drive to kill was truly an inexorable compulsion, then it 
would not have mattered who, or what, was influencing him. Fourth, the people who 
knew Kaczynski during the midst of his crime spree said that he did not exhibit any 
noticeable indicia of insanity or craziness.112 Fifth, the fact that Kaczynski was able to 
understand his trial proceedings, consider different approaches to conducting his 
defense, and formulate a preference for a particular type of defense, suggests that he 
was probably engaging in the same consideration of multiple options at the time of his 
offenses. Finally, Kaczynski’s numerous writings and time-consuming planning and 
preparation in connection with his Unabomber activities113 suggest that he was able to 
engage in a long, deliberative consideration of his acts at the time of their commission; 
                                                                                                                 
 
 111. Kaczynski said, “I don't know if violence is ever the best solution, but there are certain 
circumstances in which it may be the only solution.” Dubner, supra note 12, at 52. 
 112. “They wanted to know if we felt he was normal when he came into town. And I think 
it’s fair to say that, yes, he was.” Jackson, supra note 64, at 4. 
 113. Investigators found the following in Kaczynski’s Montana cabin: “a fully-armed bomb”; 
“bomb-making parts and chemicals”; “carbon copies of the Unabomber’s manifesto” (which 
detailed his reasons for engaging in violence against modern technology); “taunting letters to his 
victims and the news media”; “[T]housands of pages of diaries and journals”; “code . . . filled 
with the methodical observations of a man driven to kill his enemies by building the perfect 
bomb”; and “a long, detailed confession to every bomb the Unabomber sent,” including 
passages with such damning lines as “I intend to start killing people” and “I came back to the 
Chicago area . . . so that I could more safely attempt to murder a scientist, businessman, or the 
like.” Jackson, supra note 8, at 40. Prosecutors, therefore, wanted Kaczynski to receive the 
death penalty. Id. 
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this capacity is inconsistent with the lack of choice that underlies the rationale for the 
insanity defense. 
 
B. The Death Penalty 
1. The Rationale 
In Atkins v. Virginia,114 in the course of holding that the death penalty is 
unconstitutional as applied to defendants with mental retardation, the U.S. Supreme 
Court articulated a view of the rationale for and proper application of the death 
penalty. The rationale, like that of the insanity defense, lies in the Punishment Model, 
with additional reference to the Prevention Model115: the purpose of the death penalty 
is “retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders.”116 The Court 
held that if the imposition of the death penalty does not “measurably contribute[] to 
one or both of these goals, it is nothing more than the purposeless and needless 
imposition of pain and suffering, and hence an unconstitutional punishment.”117 
With respect to retribution, the death penalty, like the insanity defense, seeks to 
ensure that the offender receives his “just deserts.”118 Atkins, however, introduces a 
slightly different concept at the heart of death penalty application: “the severity of the 
appropriate punishment necessarily depends on the culpability of the offender.”119 
Since the death penalty is the most severe punishment an offender can receive, it 
should be reserved for “a narrow category of the most serious crimes.”120 However, the 
Court explained that, “[b]ecause of their disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, 
and control of their impulses . . . [the mentally retarded] do not act with the level of 
moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal 
conduct.”121Therefore, the Court held that, “to ensure that only the most deserving of 
execution are put to death,” the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to people 
with mental retardation.122 
With respect to deterrence, “it seems likely that capital punishment can serve as a 
deterrent only when murder is the result of premeditation and deliberation.”123 The 
theory behind deterrence is that an increased punishment will deter would-be criminals 
from engaging in criminal acts.124 However, because people with mental retardation 
have impaired reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses, it is “less likely that 
they can process the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 114. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 115. “The goal of a prevention regime is reduction of harm to others.” SLOBOGIN, supra note 
95, at 10. For additional information, see id. at 103–77. 
 116. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)). 
 117. Id. (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 309. 
 122. Id. at 319. 
 123. Id. (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 799 (1982)). 
 124. See id. at 320. 
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result, control their conduct based upon that information.”125 “Thus, executing the 
mentally retarded will not measurably further the goal of deterrence.”126 
Thus, Atkins appears to set forth the following constitutional baselines for proper 
applicability of the death penalty: First, to be eligible for the death penalty, a defendant 
must possess “the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult 
criminal conduct.”127 While defining the highest levels of moral culpability is difficult, 
this much is clear: impairment in reasoning, judgment, or control of one’s impulses 
reduces moral culpability. Second, a defendant cannot be so cognitively impaired that 
he has reduced appreciation for the existence and implications of the death penalty. 
Again, the line between permissible cognitive ability and impermissible cognitive 
ability is unclear. But the criteria at least provide a basis for determining the 
applicability of the death penalty after Atkins. 
 
2. The Death Penalty and Paranoid Schizophrenia 
A diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia could possibly lead a judge or jury to find a 
defendant ineligible for the death penalty because, under Atkins, a person with 
paranoid schizophrenia appears to be at least on par with a person with mental 
retardation in terms of cognitive impairment. In terms of culpability, while a person 
with mental retardation might have impaired reasoning, judgment, and control, a 
person with paranoid schizophrenia might suffer from delusional thinking that forces 
certain acts. While a person with mental retardation may have difficulty making 
choices, the person with paranoid schizophrenia may have no choice at all. The 
impairment, combined with hallucinations, disorganized thinking, inability to initiate 
plans, and disorganized conduct,128 suggests that a person with paranoid schizophrenia 
could actually be less culpable than a person with mental retardation. Moreover, since 
paranoid schizophrenia is theorized by many to be caused by organic problems in the 
brain, it may be analogous to mental retardation in that one cannot exercise control 
over one’s symptoms. 
Furthermore, a person with paranoid schizophrenia may not be able to sufficiently 
appreciate the import of the death penalty for deterrence purposes. If a person is 
compelled by voices in his head to commit homicide, the death penalty probably will 
have little if any deterrent effect. In extreme cases, like the man who persistently but 
wrongly believed that he was shrinking,129 the death penalty would not pose any 
deterrent effect because of his inexorable belief that he would ultimately not face its 
consequences. Even in less extreme cases, the mere presence of disorganized thinking 
might be a sufficient cognitive impairment to render the individual unable to appreciate 
fully the nature and effects of the death penalty. Thus, to the extent that a judge is 
influenced by literature on a paranoid schizophrenia diagnosis, a judge or jury could 
find a defendant ineligible for the death penalty because of a lack of free will and a 
lack of appreciation for the nature of the death penalty. 
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 128. See Mayo Clinic Staff, supra note 22. 
 129. Thanks to Professor Christopher Slobogin for this example. 
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3. The Death Penalty and the Unabomber 
In contrast, at least under the plausible scenario described in Part I, Theodore 
Kaczynski was not only eligible for the death penalty, but arguably an ideal candidate 
due to his high degree of premeditation and understanding.130 First, all indications are 
that Kaczynski extensively planned, prepared, and pondered before engaging in 
specific attacks, suggesting heightened culpability. In preparation for his trial, 
prosecutors were prepared to show jurors the following evidence from Kaczynski’s 
cabin: “a fully-armed bomb”; “bomb-making parts and chemicals”; “carbon copies of 
the Unabomber’s manifesto” (which detailed his reasons for engaging in violence 
against modern technology); “taunting letters to his victims and the news media”; 
“[T]housands of pages of diaries and journals”; “code . . . filled with the methodical 
observations of a man driven to kill his enemies by building the perfect bomb”; and “a 
long, detailed confession to every bomb the Unabomber sent,” including passages with 
such damning lines as “I intend to start killing people” and “I came back to the 
Chicago area . . . so that I could more safely attempt to murder a scientist, 
businessman, or the like.”131 
Second, Kaczynski’s “delusion” about the evil of modern technology, as discussed 
earlier, developed gradually as the culmination of a lifetime of pain and suffering with 
respect to society; he chose to direct his angst at an identifiable scapegoat. Third, as 
already shown, the opinions of Kaczynski’s acquaintances in Lincoln and of Kaczynski 
himself regarding his sanity during the years as the Unabomber support the idea that 
his crime spree was the product of careful deliberation, not uncontrollable impulse or 
delusion. These observations suggest that Kaczynski not only had the capacity to make 
a choice, but was extremely culpable in the sense that he put great thought and 
preparation into his crimes. 
Furthermore, Kaczynski apparently had the mental capacity to understand the nature 
of the death penalty. Kaczynski held a degree from Harvard and a Ph.D. in 
mathematics from the University of Michigan, and, prior to his move to Montana, he 
was a professor of mathematics at the University of California, Berkeley. He also 
reportedly had an IQ of 170.132 This is not the resume of a person incapable, relative to 
the rest of society, of understanding the consequences of the death penalty. And, as 
already mentioned, Kaczynski himself indicated that he had considered the possibility 
of punishment for his crimes but decided to commit them anyway because they were 
the “only solution” to his problems.133 Thus, Kaczynski fully understood the meaning 
and import of the death penalty. 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 130. There are numerous ethical, moral, and legal objections to the death penalty. I do not 
take a position on these issues. The conclusion here, that Kaczynski was especially suited for the 
death penalty, is just in reference to the goals set forth in Atkins and not any broader views about 
the morality of the death penalty in general. 
 131. See Jackson, supra note 8, at 40. 
 132. See Stampfl, supra note 47. 
 133. See Dubner, supra note 12, at 52. 
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CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing discussion, judges and juries should be aware of the perils 
associated with considering a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia in the determination 
of legal issues related to the mental condition of a criminal defendant. One possible 
solution is simply to eliminate a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia as evidence that 
can be considered by judge or jury.134 A second might be to focus more intently on the 
specific sources of confusion and limit any exclusion of evidence to symptoms not 
actually present and evidence that is likely to result in a distortion of actual 
symptoms.135 A third might be to devise much stricter standards for the admissibility of 
diagnostic evidence, such as requiring the proponent of such evidence to show that its 
probative value is greater than its likely prejudicial effect. Regardless of the specific 
route pursued, the legal community should be aware of the problems that might 
accompany emphasis on a paranoid schizophrenia diagnosis in criminal proceedings so 
that it can move forward with its eyes wide open. 
The extent to which the lessons in this paper should apply to other mental disorder 
diagnoses, however, remains an open question. As discussed at the outset of this 
Article, Morse believes that all mental disorder diagnoses should be eliminated from 
consideration in criminal proceedings,136 while Slobogin and Bonnie believe the 
opposite because such diagnoses can be useful.137 The analysis in this Article does not 
support either position completely. It is possible that other mental disorder diagnoses, 
in other circumstances, may in fact prove useful because they contribute to an accurate 
portrayal of the underlying mental condition of the criminal defendant at issue. For 
now, though, the conclusions in this Article should put the legal community on notice 
that the use of a mental disorder diagnosis can create the potential for outcomes 
diametrically opposed to the purposes of the criminal law, at least in some instances. 
The use of diagnoses in criminal proceedings should therefore be approached, at 
minimum, with caution. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 134. See GARY B. MELTON, JOHN PETRILA, NORMAN G. POYTHRESS & CHRISTOPHER 
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